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Abstract
This paper analyzes the joint behavior of international capital fl ows by foreigners and 
domestic agents over the business cycle and during fi nancial crises. We show that gross 
capital fl ows by foreigners and domestic agents are very large and volatile relative to net 
capital fl ows. Namely, when foreigners invest in a country domestic agents tend to invest 
abroad, and vice versa. Gross capital fl ows are also pro-cyclical. During expansions, 
foreigners tend to bring in more capital and domestic agents tend to invest more abroad. 
During crises, especially during severe ones, there is retrenchment, i.e. a reduction in capital 
infl ows by foreigners and an increase in capital infl ows by domestic agents. This evidence 
sheds light on the nature of the shocks driving international capital fl ows and discriminates 
among existing theories. Our fi ndings are consistent with shocks that affect foreigners and 
domestic agents asymmetrically — e.g. sovereign risk and asymmetric information — over 
productivity shocks.
Keywords: Gross capital fl ows, net capital fl ows, domestic investors, foreign investors, 
crises.
JEL classifi cation: F21, F32.
Resumen
Este trabajo analiza el comportamiento conjunto de los fl ujos de capital internacionales, 
en la frecuencia del ciclo de negocios y durante crisis fi nancieras, por parte de residentes 
y no residentes. El trabajo muestra que, en relación a los fl ujos de capital netos, los fl ujos 
de capital brutos por parte de residentes y no residentes son grandes y muy volátiles. 
Esto es así porque, cuando los no residentes invierten en un país, los residentes de esa 
economía tienden a invertir más fuera. También se encuentra que los fl ujos de capital brutos 
son prociclicos. Durante periodos de expansión económica, los no residentes inyectan 
capital en la economía mientras que los residentes invierten fuera. Durante crisis hay 
«retrenchment», i.e. una reducción en la entrada de capital por parte de no residentes 
y una reducción en el patrón de inversión exterior de los agentes domésticos. Esto es 
especialmente signifi cativo durante crisis severas y crisis sistémicas. Esta evidencia provee 
información sobre la naturaleza de los choques que guían el comportamiento de los fl ujos 
de capital internacionales. Los resultados parecen defender la preeminencia de choques 
que afectan a residentes y no residentes de forma asimétrica —p.e. riesgo soberano o 
información asimétrica— sobre choques de productividad.
Palabras claves: Flujos de capital brutos, inversores residentes, inversores no residentes, 
dinámicas, crisis.
Códigos JEL: F21, F32.
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During the last decades, international capital flows have played an increasingly important role in
the business cycles of developed and developing countries alike, especially during episodes of
financial crises. Capital flows are volatile and pro-cyclical and crises are associated with declines
in net capital inflows. These patterns are more extreme in emerging markets and have even
motivated the use of the term sudden stops to refer to the large collapses in capital inflows that
often accompany crises. Overall, there is a large literature analyzing the cyclical behavior of net
capital flows.1
Net capital flows reflect in fact the joint behavior of foreign and domestic agents. In particular,
net capital inflows are equal to the purchases of domestic assets by foreign agents minus the
purchases of foreign assets by domestic agents. These gross capital flows, in turn, depend on the
different incentives faced by foreign and domestic agents. For example, agents might invest
directly in a firm located in a foreign country if they have access to a technology that is superior to
that of domestic agents, an asset might be more attractive for some agents than others if it provides
a better hedge to their non-pledgeable labor income, and sovereign risk might make the return of
an asset depend on the residency of the agent who holds it. As a result, it seems reasonable to
expect a different contribution to net capital flows by foreign and domestic agents.
A number of studies have analyzed long-run trends in gross capital flows.2 But surprisingly,
there are very few studies of the cyclical behavior of gross capital flows. The literature has so far
focused on classifying episodes of abrupt reversals in capital inflows into those driven by foreign
agents, or true sudden stops, and those driven by domestic agents, or episodes of capital flight.3,4
1 See, for example, Dornbusch, Goldfajn, and Valdés (1995), Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998), Calvo,
Izquierdo and Mejia (2002), Broner and Rigobon (2006), Levchenko and Mauro (2007), and Mendoza (forthcoming).
2 See, for example, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007), Kraay, Loayza, Servén, and Ventura (2005), Devereux
(2007), and Gourinchas and Rey (2007a and 2007b). These studies have shown that gross capital flows have on
average been sizeable, which has resulted in large gross international investment positions.
3 See Faucette, Rothenberg, and Warnock (2005), Cowan, De Gregorio, Micco, and Neilson (2008), Forbes and
Warnock (2010), and Rothenberg and Warnock (forthcoming).
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However, many important questions remain unanswered. Are periods in which foreign agents
purchase domestic assets also periods in which domestic agents sell foreign assets? In other words,
do capital flows by foreign and domestic agents tend to move in tandem?5 What is the behavior of
gross capital flows over the business cycle and during financial crises? We know that crises are
associated with reductions in net capital inflows. But are these reductions on average due to sales
of domestic assets by foreign agents, purchases of foreign assets by domestic agents, or both?
The aim of this paper is to answer the type of questions above by analyzing systematically the
dynamics of gross capital flows. For brevity, let CIF denote capital inflows by foreign agents and
COD denote capital outflows by domestic agents. Positive CIF and COD both associate with
increases in gross international investment positions. To construct CIF and COD, we use balance
of payments data from the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund.
CIF equals net purchases of domestic assets by non-residents and is thus equal to the sum of all
liability inflows. COD equals net purchases of foreign assets by domestic agents and is thus equal
to the negative of the sum of all asset inflows, including international reserves. Hence, net capital
flows are equal to the difference CIF-COD.
Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution over time of CIF and COD, normalized by trend GDP, for
a number of developed and developing countries. As an example, consider the case the United
States. It is clear from the figure that gross capital flows behave very differently from net capital
flows. For instance, the 2008 financial crisis was characterized by a sharp drop in gross capital
flows in the United States, even though net flows have remained relatively stable. Furthermore, the
observed positive comovement between CIF and COD indicates that capital inflows by foreigners
4 Other studies have analyzed the behavior of domestic and foreign investors around particular events and in specific
markets. For example, Frankel and Schmukler (1996) focus on the behavior of mutual funds during the Mexican crisis,
while Dvorak (2003) looks at equity flows in and out the United States.
5 Dvorak (2003), Hnatkovska (2010) and Tille and van Wincoop (2010) report a positive correlation between foreign
asset purchases by domestic agents and domestic asset purchases by foreign agents for the United States.
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and outflows by domestic agents move in the same direction. As a consequence, gross capital
flows are more volatile than net capital flows. As illustrated by Figures 1 and 2, such behavior is
observed in most countries and during most crises in our sample. Overall, our main findings are:
(i) Over the last four decades, the volatilities of CIF and COD have been large and increasing,
especially relative to the much lower volatility of net capital flows. This reflects the increasingly
positive correlation between CIF and COD.
(ii) Gross capital flows are pro-cyclical. In other words, during expansions foreign agents
increase their purchases of domestic assets and domestic agents increase their purchases of foreign
assets. During crises, especially during severe ones, there is a reduction in gross capital flows.
Both CIF and COD fall, although CIF tends to fall more as crises tend to be associated with lower
net capital flows. The 2008 financial crisis is a clear example of such retrenchment, but we provide
robust empirical evidence that capital retrenchment was a feature of previous episodes as well.
(iii) A decomposition of CIF and COD reveals interesting heterogeneity in the behavior of their
components around crises. In the case of CIF, its reduction is due to declines in all its components
for all country groups. In the case of COD for developed countries, its reduction is due to declines
in equity, portfolio debt, bank flows, and direct investments, but not in reserves. For developing
countries, declines in reserves play an important role in accounting for the reduction in COD, but
there are also significant declines in equity, bank flows, and direct investments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data. Section 2
characterizes the comovement of capital flows by foreigners and domestic agents. Section 3
analyzes the behavior of gross capital flows over the business cycle and during crises. Section 4
discusses the implications of our results regarding the sources of fluctuations in economies open to
capital flows. Section 5 concludes.
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1 Data
To document worldwide patterns of capital flows by domestic and foreign agents, we assemble a
comprehensive dataset on aggregate gross capital flows, including not only capital inflows and
outflows but also their subcomponents, reflecting the different flow types. The data come from the
analytic presentation of the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbooks (BOP).6 The IMF’s
BOP dataset provides country-level data, on an annual basis from 1970 until 2009, on different
types of capital inflows measured in U.S. dollars. Fundamental to our goal, this dataset allows us to
disentangle capital outflows by domestic agents (COD) and capital inflows by foreigners (CIF),
which are reported as flows related to the reporting country’s assets and liabilities vis-à-vis
non-residents, respectively. In other words, CIF is recorded as capital inflows to the reporting
economy by foreign agents, indicating an increase in foreigners’ holdings of domestic assets.
Analogously, COD is reported as flows from the reporting economy, where positive values
correspond to an increasing of the holdings of foreign assets by domestic agents.7 Hence a
negative COD should be interpreted as capital inflows by domestic agents whereas a positive COD
means capital outflows.
Our dataset also allows us to analyze the behavior of the different types of capital flows. Flows
are classified as: direct investments, portfolio flows, other investments (mostly bank flows and
trade credit), and international reserves.8 Portfolio flows are further divided into equity and debt
flows. Both private and public flows are included in our dataset. Therefore, CIF, the aggregate
capital inflows measure by foreigners, is equivalent to the sum of the following inflows: direct
6 Debt refinancing and rescheduling entries that involve changes in existing debt contracts or replacement by new
ones, generally with extended debt service payments are excluded from our dataset. In the analytic presentation of the
IMF's BOP, these flows (credit and debt entries that account for the new contracts) are computed within a country's
financial account as exceptional financing items. Therefore, our analysis excludes items derived from the rescheduling
or refinancing of existing debt contracts as they generally do not involve new capital inflows to the reporting country.
7 These measures however do not capture increases in foreigners’ (domestic agents’) holdings of domestic (foreign)
assets that are due to valuation effects.
8 Due to their relatively small size and the scarcity of data, we exclude flows in financial derivatives from our analysis.
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investments in the reporting economy, portfolio investment liabilities, and other investment
liabilities. Similarly, COD is the aggregation of outflows of direct investments abroad, portfolio
investment assets, other investment assets, and international reserve assets. As our aim is to shed
light on both how large and how volatile capital flows are, we scale CIF and COD and their
components by trend GDP throughout the paper. 9
Our sample of countries is based mostly on data availability. However, we exclude countries
that are either very small or poor. Small countries are a concern because they might display an
artificially high volume of financial transactions due to their role as offshore financial centers or
tax havens. A country is considered small if its gross national income (GNI) in 2005 was less than
four billion U.S. dollars, PPP adjusted. Thirty countries are excluded from the analysis for this
reason, among them Belize, Guyana, and Maldives. Poor countries generally depend heavily on
official aid flows that behave differently than private capital flows, and are thus beyond the scope
of our analysis. We exclude 46 countries with GNI per capita smaller than 2,000 current U.S.
dollars, PPP adjusted, in 2005, among them Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Niger.10
We classify our final sample of 103 countries into groups according to their income levels as
measured by their GNI per capita in 2005. In particular, we classify low-income countries as those
with GNI per capita below 7,500 U.S. dollars. Middle-income countries include those with GNI
per capita between 7,500 and 15,000 U.S. dollars. These two groups, low- and middle-income
countries, are sometimes referred to as developing countries in this paper. Lastly, high-income
countries are those with GNI per capita above 15,000 U.S. dollars.11
9 Trend GDP is calculated by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to the series of nominal GDP in U.S. dollars.
Nominal GDP is obtained from the World Development Indicators. If data for the last years of the sample was not
available, we complemented our dataset with data from the World Economic Outlook 2009.
10 We used 2005 data on both GNI and GNI per capita as using more updated data would reduce significantly our
sample coverage. Moreover, the ranking of countries relative to the thresholds used in this paper does not change
considerably over time.
11 See Appendix Table 1 for the sample coverage. First and last years of available data are reported for each country.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 14 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1039
In order to analyze capital flows around crises, we create a composite crisis indicator that takes
into account banking, currency, and domestic and external debt crises on an annual basis. We
consider the initial year of either one of these measures of crisis as the beginning of a crisis period.
We then refine this aggregate indicator by considering as the beginning of a crisis period those
periods in which a country experiences the beginning of a crisis, and no other crisis has been
observed in the preceding two years.
In order to obtain the starting dates of these different crises, we use several indicators available in
the literature. Banking crises come from the dating of crisis periods available in Honohan and
Laeven (2005), Laeven and Valencia (2008), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). Currency crises are
identified through the methodology in Laeven and Valencia (2008), which in turn follows Frankel
and Rose (1996).12 Under this definition, a country experiences a currency crisis if there is a
nominal depreciation of the exchange rate of at least 30 percent that is also at least a 10 percent
increase in the rate of depreciation of the previous year. For countries meeting this criteria for
several consecutive years, only the first year within five-year windows is considered a crisis year
in our analysis. Domestic debt crises are identified by the year in which Standard & Poor’s
downgrades the local currency debt of an economy into default. We also consider episodes
identified in Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). Analogously, for external debt crises, we consider the
crisis dating in Laeven and Valencia (2008) and Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) as well as Standard
& Poor’s downgrades of foreign currency debt and foreign currency bank loans of an economy to
default levels. Appendix Table 2 lists all the crisis episodes considered in our sample.
We further classify these crises events into two different types of episodes depending on the
intensity of the turmoil affecting a country. First, we define one crisis episodes in which a country
12 We use just one indicator of currency crises as most indicators described in the literature are constructed using data
on reserves, one of our variables of interest, hence making them less appropriate for our analysis.
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experiences the beginning of one, and only one, type of crisis in a given year, and no other type of
crisis is observed in the preceding two years. The second episode type considers periods in which a
country faces the beginning of more than one type of crisis within a given year, and no such event
has occurred in the previous two years. These severe episodes are called more than one crisis. In
sum, we distinguish between mild and severe crisis episodes according to the number of different
types of crises a country faces in any given year.
The final database, after the sample adjustments mentioned above, covers 103 countries over
the 1970-2009 sample period. There are 39 countries classified as high-income, and 28 of these
countries have experienced at least one crisis during our sample period and five countries have
faced severe crisis episodes. Our sample includes 26 middle-income countries, which have
experienced significantly more turmoil than high-income countries. All countries faced at least
one crisis within our sample period and a total of 78 crises episodes (24 severe ones) have been
observed in these countries. Lastly, 38 low-income countries are included in our empirical analysis
and all but one country have gone through at least one crisis episode. In total, these low-income
countries have experienced 96 crises episodes, being 27 severe ones.
2 The Behavior of Capital Flows by Foreign and Domestic Agents
In this section, we study the behavior of gross capital flows over the past decades for our sample
economies. Figures 1 and 2, as mentioned above, suggest a strong comovement between inflows
by foreigners and outflows by domestic agents, i.e. increases in CIF tend to be accompanied by
increases in COD. Furthermore, the graphs suggest that this correlation seems to hold in both
tranquil and turbulent periods, when a retrenchment in flows is observed. In the rest of this section,
we formalize this intuition and document the joint behavior of CIF and COD.
Table 1 presents some summary statistics. Gross capital flows, measured as a percentage of
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output, have increased over time around the world. Confirming the trends seen in Figures 1 and 2,
these increases suggests a broad process of financial globalization with capital flows increasing for
both domestic and foreign agents, and especially so for high- and middle-income countries. For
example, CIF increases from about 4.8 percent (0.8 percent) of trend GDP for the median
high-income (middle-income) country in the 80s to more than 15 percent (5 percent) of trend GDP
in high-income (middle-income) economies in the 2000s. Similar patterns are observed for COD.
In particular, for developing countries, a noticeable and larger increase in the value of COD takes
place during the 2000s. Nevertheless, there is no clear evidence of such a positive trend in net
capital flows. If anything, they have decreased over time for both high- and low-income countries.
Table 1 also shows that over time the volatility of gross capital inflows has increased
significantly more than that of net capital flows. For high-income countries, the median standard
deviation of CIF (COD) is 9.1 (8.1) percent of trend GDP during the 2000s, compared to 2.6 (2.3)
during the 1970s. In middle- and low-income countries the increase in the volatility of gross flows
is less pronounced. For example, the median standard deviation of CIF is 4.9 percent of trend GDP
for middle-income countries in the 2000s, compared to 3.07 during the 1970s. In low-income
countries, an even less pronounced trend is observed. The standard deviation of COD (CIF) goes
from 2.1 (3.3) in the 1980s to 3.4 (3.9) in the 2000s.
These statistics indicate that the volatility of gross capital flows is larger for high-income
countries than for middle-income countries in recent decades. These patterns stand in contrast with
the well-known fact that net capital flows are more volatile in developing countries, which is also
observed in our analysis. The median standard deviation of net capital flows is 3.9 and 5.6 for
high- and middle-income countries, respectively, over the entire sample period. In contrast to the
observed patterns in gross capital flows, the volatility of net capital flows has remained relatively
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stable over the past three decades for countries across all income levels. Thus, the standard
deviation of net capital inflows in middle income countries was 3.9 during the 70s, increasing to
4.2 in the 90s, and declining back to 3.9 in the 2000s. In high- and low-income countries, the
volatility of flows has increased slightly over time. In low-income countries, the standard
deviation of net flows was 4.1 percent of trend GDP in the 80s and reached 4.4 in the 2000s.
These statistics suggest that not only gross capital flows are increasingly larger, but they are
increasingly more volatile, and increasingly so, than net capital flows. This is the case for
high-income countries over the whole sample and for middle-income countries in the 2000s. As
shown in Table 1, the median standard deviation of COD and CIF for high-income
(middle-income) countries is 8.1 and 7.8 percent of trend GDP, respectively, a much larger
statistics than standard deviation of net flows, 3.9 percent of trend GDP. If we consider only the
2000s, the differences are even larger. In middle-income countries, the standard deviation of net
flows is also smaller than that of gross capital flows by both foreigners and domestic agents in the
last decade. However, before the 2000s, the volatility in net capital flows was actually higher than
the volatility of its disaggregated components. Likely reflecting the more closed capital accounts
and greater restrictions on foreign investments by domestic agents in those countries, especially in
the first half of our sample, the volatility of net flows is larger than that of gross capital flows
throughout our entire sample for low-income countries.
These patterns suggest an increasing importance of gross capital flows in the 2000s. Figure 3
further illustrates how gross flows have increased over time while net capital flows have remained
relatively stable. The figure shows ellipses corresponding to the bivariate Gaussian distribution of
COD and CIF. Each ellipsis summarizes the distribution of the observations (one per
country-year) during each one of the last three decades. The ellipses are centered at the mean of
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these variables and their shape is given by their covariance matrix. The main axes of the ellipses
are given by the first and second principal components of the covariance matrix, while the
boundaries of the ellipses capture two standard deviations, hence encompassing 86% of the total
probability mass. An increase in size in these ellipses along the inverted 45-degree line shows an
increase in gross capital flows, whereas the distance between the boundaries of the ellipsis and this
inverted 45-degree line indicates the magnitude of net capital flows. Notice that the inverted
45-degree line in Figure 3 captures country-year observations in which net capital flows are zero,
i.e. COD is equal to CIF. Thus, Figure 3 shows that capital flows by both foreigners and domestic
agents have increased steadily over time, and especially so in the 2000s, while net flows have not
changed considerable over time.
Our results so far support a generalized process of financial globalization with capital flows by
both foreign and domestic agents increasing significantly over time, particularly since the 1990s.
We next assess whether this suggested positive correlation between CIF and COD indeed holds
when performing a cross-country and time-series comparison over the four decades under study.
More formally, we estimate the following regressions:
,,,, tctctc ControlsCODCIF ??? ????? (1)
,,,, tctctc ControlsCIFCOD ??? ????? (2)
where controls stand for additional control-variables such as country-trends. To prevent the
estimates from being driven by individual countries, CIF and COD are not only scaled by trend
GDP, but also further standardized by de-meaning and scaling by their corresponding standard
deviations on a country by country basis. The results are reported in Table 2, where countries are
once more split in our three income groups. We present estimations for the whole sample as well as
for each of the decades under analysis.
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The estimations provide robust evidence that CIF is positively correlated with COD. In other
words, when foreigners invest in a country, its domestic agents invest abroad. Such a positive
correlation generates an expansion in financial globalization, in which a country’s international
assets and liabilities expand. Conversely, when foreign capital leaves, domestic capital placed
abroad is repatriated. In other words, a retrenchment in gross capital flows is observed. In line with
the graphical evidence, the positive comovement between gross capital flows has increased over
time, as the magnitude of the coefficients increase. Moreover, the estimated coefficient increases
with countries’ income level. The estimated coefficient for low-income countries is 0.27, while the
same parameter is 0.44 for middle-income countries and 0.78 for high-income countries.13
In sum, the evidence in this section suggests that capital flows by domestic and foreign agents
have become increasingly large and volatile, surpassing the size and, in most cases, the volatility
of net capital flows. Furthermore, CIF and COD are positively correlated. In other words, there are
periods of globalization and periods of retrenchment. We investigate next the cyclical properties
of gross capital flows and their behavior around financial crises.
3 The Cyclical Behavior of Gross Capital Flows
In the previous section, we showed that capital inflows by foreigners and outflows by domestic
agents are positively correlated. In this section, we explore the cyclical properties of gross capital
flows by analyzing the behavior of CIF and COD over the business cycle and around crises. We
provide empirical evidence that periods of financial globalization tend to occur during economic
expansions and retrenchment periods tend to occur during contractions or crises.
3.1 Gross Capital Flows over the Business Cycle
To analyze the cyclical properties of gross capital flows, we estimate the following equations:
13 Similar estimates are obtained if a different set of controls is used. If year dummies are included the results are
qualitatively similar, although point estimates decrease, suggesting the presence of systemic or aggregate effects.
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,,,, tctctc ControlsXY ??? ????? (3)
where Yc,t stands for CIF, COD, or a measure of aggregate flows, CIF+COD; Xc,t represents either
net capital flows, the trade balance in goods and services, or a measure of GDP fluctuations; and
controls stand for additional control variables such as country-trends, as above. In these
regressions, net capital flows are calculated using the standardized versions of CIF and COD. The
trade balance in goods and services is also scaled by trend GDP, demeaned and standardized by
their standard deviations at the country level.14 Our measure of business cycles is based on real
GDP in constant units of local currency.15 More specifically, we consider the growth rates in real
GDP, which should capture accurately the current state of the economy over the business cycle.16
The results are reported in Table 3. Net capital inflows are strongly associated with capital
inflows by foreigners for all income groups. For high-income countries, they are also strongly
correlated with capital outflows by domestic agents. However, such association is not as strong in
middle- and low-income countries; where as larger coefficients are estimated for CIF. Note that
net capital flows are calculated as the difference between CIF and COD, and are thus, by
construction, correlated with our dependent variables. To partly avoid this correlation, we use the
trade balance in goods and services as an alternative measure of capital flows to the extent that it
captures the other side of the balance of payments. The estimated coefficients confirm the previous
results. The trade balance is strongly correlated with capital flows by foreigners, and more so than
flows by domestic agents in middle- and low-income countries.
Regarding the dynamics of gross capital flows at the business cycles, we find that gross capital
14 The data on the trade balance are from the IMF's Balance of Payment Statistics Yearbooks.
15 Real GDP in constant units of local currency comes from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. This
information was complemented with data from the IMF's World Economic Outlook 2009 if the data from the original
source were missing.
16 As an alternative measure of business cycles, we also considered a measure of output gap based on the
Hodrick-Prescott filter. The results were qualitatively similar to the ones reported here.
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flows expand during good times, while during bad times, they decline. In other words, we find that
not only capital flows by foreigners are pro-cyclical. Capital outflows by domestic agents are also
pro-cyclical, with domestic agents investing more abroad in good times when the economy is
above potential or is growing in real terms. As a consequence, as shown by the estimated
coefficients on CIF+COD, expansions in financial globalization, in which a country's
international assets and liabilities expand, are observed during good times. Analogously, during
downturns in economic activity, there is retrenchment in gross capital flows.
Furthermore, the evidence in Table 3 expands the widely-documented pro-cyclicality of net
capital inflows. During booms, foreigners increase their purchases of domestic assets and
domestic agents augment their investments abroad. These patterns suggest that changes in net
capital inflows are driven mostly by foreigners in developing economies; with domestic agents’
behavior being most relevant for the behavior of net flows in high-income countries.
3.2 Gross Capital Flows during Crises
We start by providing some descriptive statistics comparing the behavior of CIF and COD during
turbulent and tranquil periods. Turbulent periods are defined as those falling within a five-year
window around each crisis episode. As shown in Table 4, both capital inflows by foreigners and
capital outflows by domestic agents decline during turbulent periods for countries from all income
groups. For example, CIF falls by almost 50 percent for high-income countries while COD
decreases by about 65 percent. Similarly, declines between 40 and 50 percent of trend GDP in
gross capital flows are observed in low-income countries. In middle-income countries, the
retrenchment in gross capital flows is even stronger – CIF decline from inflows of 7.2 percent of
trend GDP to actual outflows of 2.6 percent of trend GDP and COD go from outflows of 6.5
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percent of trend GDP to inflows of 2.6 percent of trend GDP.17
Despite the similarities in the dynamics of gross capital flows among countries from all income
levels, the behavior of net capital flows is rather contrasting. While net capital inflows increase
during crises for high-income countries, middle- and low-income countries face a decline in net
capital inflows. This evidence suggests that retrenchment by domestic agents is stronger than that
of foreigners in high-income countries but weaker in developing economies.
More formally, an event study analysis of gross capital flows around crises reinforces this
evidence. We focus on the dynamics of CIF and COD not only during the crisis year, but also in its
run-up and immediate aftermath by analyzing the preceding and following two years. We estimate
the following equation:
,,,
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(4)
where Yc,t stands for our standardized measures of CIF or COD; Crisis is the composite crisis
indicator; and controls capture the additional control variables such as country-trends.18 Once
more, we perform the analysis by pooling countries according to their income level.
The estimates are presented in Table 5 and Figure 4. They provide robust evidence of a
retrenchment in capital flows by both foreign and domestic agents for countries from all income
groups. In particular, both CIF and COD are negative and statistically different than zero in the
crisis year for countries in all income groups but for CIF in high-income countries. Table 5 also
presents Wald tests that check if the behavior of flows in the crisis year or in the immediate
aftermath was significantly different from the one observed in the run-up. Thus, Wald tests show
the decline in capital inflows by foreigners and capital outflows by domestic agents in the crisis
17 To the extent that official flows are unlikely to decline during crises, the milder reaction of capital flows in
low-income countries if compared to middle-income ones might be explained by the relative size of these flows.
18 We report results with country-trends as controls only, but our results are qualitatively similar if we add year
dummies as controls as well.
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year in comparison to the average flow in the previous two years is statistically significant for all
income levels, including CIF in high-income countries. Furthermore, the Wald Tests show that
gross capital flows remained at depressed levels, or declined even further, during the two-year
period after the onset of the crisis.
Figure 4 shows that the median retrenchment in gross capital flows around crises is rather
large. For instance, CIF in high-income countries on average decline from inflows of 5.5 percent
of trend GDP in the pre-crisis year to outflows of 4.3 percent in the first post-crisis year. In
middle-income countries, these flows reverse from 0.4 to -2.5 percent of trend GDP over the same
period. In low-income countries, CIF declines from around 0.2 percent of trend GDP in the two
years preceding the turmoil period to around -1.7 percent of trend GDP in the year following the
onset of the crisis. Similar numbers are estimated for COD.
The analysis so far has included the global financial crisis that hit countries in 2008. However,
the empirical evidence in Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2010) suggests that this latest crisis has been
marked by a significant decline in capital flows around the world. A re-estimation of equation (4)
around this episode, reported in the top panel of Table 6, reproduces their findings. The Wald tests
suggest a significant retrenchment in capital flows during in 2008 and the following year in
comparison to the pre-crisis period from all income groups. To the extent that this single event
might be driving our results, as a robustness exercise, we re-estimate our event study analysis
excluding the 2008 financial crisis. The results are reported in the bottom panel of Table 6.
Our previous results stand and remain statistically and economically significant. Both CIF and
COD decline significantly in the crisis year and, according to Wald tests, are statistically smaller
than their average during the preceding two years. Also consistent with our previous results, gross
capital flows during the post-crisis period remain at depressed levels in comparison to the run up to
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the crisis event. In sum, the results in Table 6 show that the behavior of foreigners and domestic
agents during the recent financial crisis is in line with their behavior during previous crisis
episodes, with estimates confirming a generalized retrenchment of gross capital flows around
these events. Hence, for the remainder of the paper, we proceed with the analysis of the data based
on our entire sample period, from 1970 to 2009.
Thus far we have considered a single crisis indicator that pools together several types of
financial crisis for a particular country in a given year. We extend this analysis by considering the
intensity of the turmoil episodes and distinguishing mild and severe crisis episodes. 19 In
particular, as described in Section 2, we classify crisis events into: one crisis episodes, in which a
country experiences the beginning of one, and only one, type of crisis in a given year; and more
than one crisis episodes, in which a country faces the beginning of more than one type of crisis
within a given year. We estimate the following equation, which adapts equation (4) to these two
indicators:
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(5)
where Yc,t stands for our standardized measures of CIF or COD; one crisis corresponds to the one
crisis indicator; more o ne crisis stands for theMmore than one crisis indicator; and controls
capture additional control variables such as country-trends. The estimated equations are reported
in Table 7 and Figure 5.
The results suggest a significant retrenchment in gross capital flows both by domestic and
foreign agents around both mild and severe crisis episodes for all income groups. During one crisis
episodes, CIF and COD decline at the onset of the crisis as well as in its aftermath, and even more
19 De Paoli et al. (2009) show that twin crises feature larger output losses than milder episodes.
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so for high-income countries, if compared to the two years before the crisis. Similar statistically
significant results are found around more than once crisis episodes. Wald tests reported in Table 7
show that CIF and COD are significantly smaller in the crisis year relative to the pre-crisis average
for countries from all income groups in our sample. The results however suggest that the
retrenchment of domestic agents in the aftermath of severe crises is more short-lived and reversed
during the following two years. Wald tests reject that COD is statistically different in the aftermath
of the turmoil episode if compared to its pre-crisis values.
This retrenchment in gross capital flows is not only statistically but also economically
significant as shown in Figure 5. In high-income countries, CIF reversers from 5.2 percent of trend
GDP in the year preceding one crisis episodes in the average country to less than -4.4 percent of
trend GDP in the first year after the onset of the crisis, suggesting a collapse in flows of over 9
percentage points. Domestic agents behave similarly during these episodes. This retrenchment in
gross capital flows around mild crisis episodes is also large in middle-income countries, where a
decline of almost 4 percentage points takes place on average during the five-year window around
mild crisis episodes, and slightly milder in low-income countries, with declines of about 1
percentage point of trend GDP over the same period. Duringmore than one crisis episodes, similar
patterns are observed. Capital inflows by domestic agents decline from 15.7 percent of trend GDP
in high-income countries to about 4 percent in the aftermath of the crisis year, implying a collapse
of flows of about 11.5 percentage points. In middle-income countries, COD declines around 5
percentage points of trend GDP in the crisis year if compared with the previous two years. Once
more, a milder decline of 2 percentage points over the same period is observed in low-income
countries.
Notice that these plots also highlight that the reaction of domestic and foreign agents might be
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 26 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1039
stronger in severe crisis episodes.More than one crisis episodes lead to significant retrenchment in
capital flows by foreign and domestic agents during the crisis year and by foreign agents in the
following two years. Wald tests reported in Table 7 shows that this graphical evidence is
statistically significant for middle- and low-income countries.20
Overall, the results reported in Table 7 and Figure 5 show that the retrenchment in gross capital
flows takes place not only around severe crises but also around mild ones. Furthermore, these
estimations suggest that such a retrenchment by domestic and foreign agents is indeed a stylized
fact regarding the dynamics of gross capital flows during crises.
3.3 The Dynamic Behavior of the Subcomponents of Gross Capital Flows during Crises
We now analyze whether a particular flow type is driving the dynamics of capital flows around
crises or the observed patterns are widespread across all flow types. First, we discuss their relative
size and their evolution over the past decades.
A decomposition of gross flows into portfolio investment flows, other investments, and direct
investment flows suggest that their composition varies across income levels. Table 8 presents
some summary statistics. In high-income countries, other investment flows are the largest
subcomponent of both CIF and COD, representing almost a 50 percent and a 40 percent
respectively. In contrast, in developing countries around half of the CIF take the form of direct
investments. For example, the median middle-income (low-income) country received FDI of 2.2
(2.5) percent of trend GDP in comparison to portfolio investments of 0.6 (0.06) percent and other
investments of 1.6 (1.9) percent. On the other hand, international reserves represent 46 (58)
percent of COD in middle-income (low-income) countries.
The striking increase in gross capital flows over time is also evident in Table 8. Nevertheless, it
20 The test results for high-income countries are less robust probably because of the low number of severe episodes,
only five in our sample.
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has not taken place across all types of flows. Other investment flows capture the bulk of the
increase in CIF in high-income countries, whereas FDI flows have increased the most for
developing countries since the 1990s. If anything, in low-income countries, other investment flows
by foreign agents have actually decreased since the 80s. Regarding COD, other investment flows
have increased considerably in the last decade for all income groups. Still, for developing
countries, the expansion of international reserves explains a large part of the increase in COD.
In sum, these summary statistics suggest that the dynamics of gross capital flows around crises
might be driven by different types of flows in different income groups. 21
In order to assess the relevance of the various flow types on the dynamics of aggregate gross
capital flows during periods of financial distress, we re-estimate equation (5) separately for each
component of COD and CIF. The results for high-, middle-, and low-income countries are
reported in Tables 9A through 9C, respectively. The estimations suggest strongly asymmetric
effects across both components of capital flows and income levels.
The results on the different components of CIF reflect partly the relative size of the different
flows. The statistically significant retrenchment in other investment flows by foreigners during
both mild and severe episodes is a regular pattern for countries from all income groups.
Nevertheless, contrasting patterns arise for other flow types. For instance, while portfolio debt
inflows decline during the post-crisis periods of both mild and severe crises in high- and
low-income countries; in middle-income countries, these inflows remain relatively stable within
our five-year windows around one crisis episodes, but significantly retrenchment around severe
21 Also the evidence on the volatility of the different types of flows sheds light on their dynamics. Other investment
flows by foreigners are the most volatile flow type for all income levels. This stands in contrast to existing perceptions
that portfolio flows are the most volatile type of flow. In fact, the volatility of these flows is similar across high- and
middle income countries. Similar patterns are observed for other investment flows by domestic agents. Their standard
deviation is larger than that of portfolio outflows or direct investments abroad for all income groups. International
reserves nevertheless are slightly more volatile in developing countries.
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episodes. Furthermore, portfolio equity inflows do not retrench considerably in middle-income
countries around severe crisis episodes, whereas they actually decline in high- and low-income
countries. During mild episodes, these flows retrench in high- and middle income but not in
low-income countries. Lastly, foreign direct investments decline only in response to mild crisis
episodes, remaining relatively stable, or even increasing, during severe crisis episodes in
high-income countries. In contrast, FDI inflows are relatively stable during mild crises in
low-income countries and tend to decline during severe crises. Middle-income countries are
somewhere in between, with significant declines during both mild and severe crisis episodes.
Overall, portfolio debt inflows and other investment inflows drive most of the retrenchment in CIF
during more than one crisis episodes, especially in high- and middle-income countries. The
patterns for one crisis events are more diffuse, varying among income levels, though other
investment flows still play a significant role.
Regarding the different components of COD, the differences across countries are even more
striking. In high-income countries, all flow types but those related to international reserves
retrench around one crisis episodes, international reserve flows retrench significantly in
middle-income countries. During more than one crisis episodes, international reserves decline in
both low- and middle-income countries. The retrenchment by domestic agents in middle- and
low-income countries is, however, not concentrated in international reserves. For middle-income
countries, there is also a significant decline in direct investments abroad and portfolio outflows
during severe crises episodes and a retrenchment in portfolio equity and other investment outflows
during mild crisis episodes. In contrast, low-income countries face only a decline in other
investment outflows in severe crises years. During mild crisis, there is a weak decrease in portfolio
equity and other investment outflows. In sum, while high-income countries do not sell their
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international reserve assets during turbulent periods, less developed countries, and especially
middle-income ones, make a buffer use of international reserves. Other investment outflows and
direct investment abroad are the other flow types mostly driving the aggregate dynamics of COD.
In this section, we have shown that periods of financial globalization are associated with
economic expansions, while periods of retrenchment in capital flows by foreigners and domestic
agents are related to downturns and financial crises. These results shed light not only on the source
of shocks affecting economic activity (e.g. productivity, terms of trade) but also on the
mechanisms behind financial crises as well as the market frictions affecting agents in these
countries. These issues are discussed in greater detail in the next section.
4 Interpreting the Evidence
In this section, we contrast the evidence presented in the previous sections with the predictions
of different theories of capital flows. On the one hand, there is a growing literature in international
macro-finance that brings portfolio choice and asset pricing considerations into dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models of international macroeconomics. These models have so far
emphasized productivity shocks as the main source of fluctuations in economies open to capital
flows. Most of these papers have focused on the long-run composition of international portfolios.22
Two recent contributions that emphasize the high-frequency behavior of international
portfolios are Hnatkovska (2010) and Tille and van Wincoop (2010). Both document that in the
United States there is a positive correlation between domestic purchases of foreign equity and
foreign purchases of domestic equity and present DSGE models that can account for this
22 See Kraay and Ventura (2000), Evans and Hnatkovska (2005), Kraay et al. (2005), Coeurdacier, Kollmann, and
Martin (2010), Devereux and Sutherland (2010 and forthcoming), and Pavlova and Rigobon (2010a). Pavlova and
Rigobon (2010b) present a survey.
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correlation.23 Hnatkovska (2010) uses a preponderance of productivity shocks in the nontradable
sector to explain this correlation. Her model is also consistent with our evidence that gross capital
flows are pro-cyclical. Tille and van Wincoop (2010) show that, even in a model with a single
good, productivity shocks can account for the positive correlation of gross capital flows. However,
their model also predicts that gross capital flows should be counter-cyclical, that is domestic
(foreign) investors should invest less abroad (at home) in good times, which is inconsistent with
the evidence presented here.
Our take is that, although it is possible to construct models in which productivity shocks lead to
a positive correlation of gross capital flows, this is not the most natural effect of productivity
shocks. As a result, such models are likely to have a hard time matching other important features of
the data. For example, the preponderance of productivity shocks in the nontradable sector
suggested by Hnatkovska (2010) is likely to imply counter-cyclical real exchange rates, as the
abundance of nontradable goods during booms reduces their price. If booms are associated with a
positive shock to the endowment of nontradable goods, then the price of nontradable goods
relative to tradable ones will likely be low in booms. In other words, the real exchange rate will be
depreciated in booms. In reality, real exchange rates are appreciated in booms and depreciated in
recessions. So cycles mostly due to shocks in the nontradable sector seem not too promising. More
broadly, our empirical evidence seems inconsistent with crises affecting foreign and domestic
agents symmetrically.
Instead, we interpret the evidence presented in this paper as suggesting that crises affect
foreign and domestic agents differently. One set of models that can account for our evidence are
those based on asymmetric information between domestic and foreign agents. One such model is
presented by Dvorak (2003), who shows that a model with asymmetric information can account
23 Dvorak (2003) presents similar evidence.
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for the positive correlation between domestic purchases of foreign equity and foreign purchases of
domestic equity. Interestingly, he shows that to account for this correlation it is also necessary to
assume the existence of asymmetric information within countries. Brenan and Cao (1997) show
that retrenchment during crises can take place if foreign agents are less informed than domestic
agents about the return of domestic assets and crises increase this informational asymmetry.24
Another set of models that can account for our evidence are those in which asset returns depend on
the residence of the holder of the asset. For example, in models based on sovereign risk domestic
agents are less likely to be defaulted on than foreign agents. This is so because residents’ welfare
enters directly in the objective function of the government, creating incentives to favor residents
vis-a-vis foreigners. Such models can easily account for retrenchment during crises in which the
probability of default increases disproportionately on foreign holders of domestic agents. Broner,
Martin, and Ventura (2010) explore in detail this mechanism in a model in which assets can be
re-traded in secondary markets. More generally, retrenchment during crises is likely to be
consistent with all models in which crises are associated with a relative deterioration of foreigners’
property rights.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides a number of important stylized facts on the dynamic behavior of gross
capital flows by domestic and foreign agents. We have shown that: (i) while the volatility of gross
capital flows has increased over time, this increase has not translated in the same magnitude into
more volatile net capital flows, since CIF and COD are highly positively correlated; (ii) gross
capital flows are pro-cyclical, with CIF and COD increasing during expansions; (iii) total gross
capital flows retrench significantly during crises, especially severe ones, and during economic
24 A related point is made by Tille and Van Wincoop (2008).
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downturns; and (iv) the behavior of gross capital flows during crises is not driven by a single
component, although international reserves play an important role in middle- and low-income
countries and debt flows play an important role in advanced and middle-income countries.
The identified behavior of gross capital flows allow us to shed light on the sources of
fluctuations for international capital flows and evaluate the adequacy and pitfalls of the most
recent and relevant theories on this issue. In particular, we find no evidence that, on average, gross
capital flows are driven by fire sales of domestic assets to foreigners and/or domestic capital flight.
The evidence also runs contrary to the view that capital flows are driven mostly by productivity
shocks, since such shocks would generally imply a similar behavior by foreigners and domestic
agents towards domestic assets. Instead, the evidence suggests that crises affect foreigners and
domestic agents asymmetrically. If, for example, crises were associated with a worsening of
investor property rights or an increase in informational asymmetries that affected foreign creditors
more than domestic creditors, we would expect the type of retrenchment observed in the data.
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Figure 1
Capital Flows in High-Income Countries
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Capital Inflows by Foreign Agents Capital Outflows by Domestic Agents
The figure shows the evolution of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) and capital outflows by domestic agents (COD) as a percentage of trend GDP
for a select sample of high-income countries from 1970 until 2009.
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Figure 2
Capital Flows in Low- and Middle-Income Countries
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Capital Inflows by Foreign Agents Capital Outflows by Domestic Agents
The figure shows the evolution of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) and capital outflows by domestic agents (COD) as a percentage of trend GDP for a select
sample of middle-income countries from 1970 until 2009.
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Joint Distribution of Capital Flows
Figure 3
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The figure shows ellipses that account for the joint distribution of capital flows by foreign and domestic agents. One ellipsis for
each decade is reported. Each ellipsis captures 103 points and each one point represents the average for that decade for a country
in our sample. Capital flows are scaled by trend GDP. 
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The figure shows the economic significance of the regression coefficients in the event study analyses of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) and capital outflows by
domestic agents (COD) around five-year windows of crisis periods. These regressions are reported in Table 5. The economic significance is defined as the product of the
estimated coefficient and the median one standard deviation of the non-standardized version of the dependent variable across countries with at least one crisis during the
period of analysis. Capital flows are first normalized by trend GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. The
sample period is from 1970 to 2009.
Capital Flows around Crises
Figure 4
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Only One Crisis
More than One Crisis
Capital Flows around Crises of Different Intensities
Figure 5
2
3
Middle-Income Countries
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
T
r
e
n
d
 
G
D
P
High-Income Countries
-3.0
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
T
r
e
n
d
 
G
D
P
Middle-Income Countries
-1.4
-1.2
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
T
r
e
n
d
 
G
D
P
Low-Income Countries
20
High-Income Countries
2
3
Low-Income Countries
The figure shows the economic significance of the regression coefficients in the event study analyses of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) and capital outflows by domestic agents (COD) around five-year windows
of crisis periods. These regressions are reported in Table 6. Crisis events are divided into One Crisis periods and More than One Crisis periods, according to their intensity. The economic significance is defined as the
product of the estimated coefficient and the median one standard deviation of the non-standardized version of the dependent variable across countries with at least one crisis during the period of analysis. Capital flows
are first normalized by trend GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. The sample period is from 1970 to 2009. 
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Median 
Average
Median 
Std. Dev.
Median 
Average
Median 
Std. Dev.
Median 
Average
Median 
Std. Dev.
Net Capital Flows (CIF - COD) 0.64 3.92 1.29 5.62 2.08 5.51
   1970s 1.64 2.41 3.37 3.94 3.54 3.09
   1980s 1.42 2.71 0.39 5.56 2.71 4.11
   1990s 0.87 2.79 0.82 4.23 1.28 4.18
   2000s -0.18 3.60 1.90 3.94 0.56 4.37
Total Gross Capital Flows (CIF + COD) 17.67 15.49 9.31 10.01 6.97 7.17
   1970s 9.50 3.62 7.01 5.27 7.92 2.75
   1980s 9.10 6.16 1.96 5.95 4.86 3.90
   1990s 13.56 9.39 7.80 5.60 7.21 5.56
   2000s 32.65 16.70 15.06 8.48 8.41 6.21
Capital Inflows by Foreign Agents (CIF) 8.89 7.81 4.83 6.06 4.07 5.21
   1970s 4.73 2.66 5.08 3.07 5.62 2.29
   1980s 4.79 3.47 0.83 4.03 3.99 3.37
   1990s 7.00 5.54 3.96 4.12 4.43 4.16
   2000s 15.16 9.16 5.58 4.96 4.22 3.93
Capital Outflows by Domestic Agents (COD) 8.33 8.05 3.78 5.10 2.87 3.87
   1970s 3.43 2.29 3.34 2.96 2.07 1.77
   1980s 3.78 3.09 1.40 2.71 0.54 2.06
   1990s 6.56 5.32 2.80 3.32 2.54 3.03
   2000s 17.71 8.13 6.44 4.86 3.73 3.35
No. of Countries
The table shows summary statistics of capital flows by both foreign and domestic agents as well as net capital flows and total
gross capital flows. The median value of country averages and of country standard deviations of capital flows over trend GDP
are shown. The sample period is from 1970 to 2009.
Table 1
39 26 38
High-Income 
Countries
Middle-Income 
Countries
Low-Income 
Countries
Capital Flows: Summary Statistics
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COD = ?*CIF (a) 0.48 ** 0.83 *** 0.93 *** 0.78 *** 0.23 *** 0.65 *** 0.44 *** 0.38 *** 0.31 *** 0.27 ***
CIF = ?*COD (b) 0.37 *** 0.68 *** 0.92 *** 0.75 *** 0.36 *** 0.88 *** 0.45 *** 0.40 *** 0.45 *** 0.27 ***
Country-Trend Dummies
No. of Countries
No. of Observations
Table 2
Correlation between Capital Flows
High-Income Countries Middle-Income Countries Low-Income Countries
1980s 1990s 2000s Whole Sample 1980s 1990s 2000s Whole Sample 1980s 1990s 2000s Whole Sample
[0.20] [0.08] [0.04] [0.05] [0.17] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.09] [0.07] [0.06]
[0.12] [0.06] [0.04] [0.05] [0.16] [0.11] [0.06] [0.06]
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
[0.07] [0.12] [0.10] [0.10]
25
Yes
0.25
0.28
0.16
0.09
Yes Yes Yes Yes
34 39 39 39 20 26 26 29 38 37 38
338 371 365 1,300 176 237 226 1,050702 277 329 332  
R-squared (a)
R-squared (b)
0.46 0.68 0.89 0.71 0.45 0.47 0.46
0.23 0.67 0.35 0.17
0.40 0.70 0.36 0.48
0.37 0.44 0.23
The table reports fixed-effects panel regressions of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) on capital outflows by domestic agents (COD) and COD on CIF by decade, controlling for country-trend effects. Capital flows are first
normalized by trend GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. The sample period is from 1970 to 2009. Standard errors, clustered at the country-level, are reported in
brackets. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%,  5%, and 1%, respectively. 
0.23
0.46 0.73 0.89 0.71 0.33
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Net Capital Flows (CIF - COD) 0.25 *** -0.24 *** -0.02
Trade Balance -0.25 *** 0.19 ** 0.00
GDP Growth 3.58 ** 5.20 *** 5.17 ***
Country-Trend Dummies
No. of Countries
No. of Observations
R-squared
Net Capital Flows (CIF + COD) 0.63 *** -0.26 ** 0.26 **
Trade Balance -0.59 *** 0.21 ** -0.25 ***
GDP Growth 3.90 *** 3.18 *** 4.47 ***
Country-Trend Dummies
No. of Countries
No. of Observations
R-squared
Net Capital Flows (CIF + COD) 0.72 *** -0.39 *** 0.32 ***
Trade Balance -0.58 *** 0.30 *** -0.27 ***
GDP Growth 3.02 *** 2.95 *** 3.71 ***
Country-Trend Dummies
No. of Countries
No. of Observations
R-squared
38
Yes Yes
0.20 0.190.60 0.29 0.23 0.40 0.23
38
1050
0.18 0.18
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
[0.04] [0.05] [0.06]
[0.86]
38 38 38
1050 1050 1050 1050
26
[0.04] [0.05] [0.05]
COD CIF+COD
702 702
COD
Low-Income Countries
681
0.22 0.270.25
702 702
26
1042 1042
[0.78]
26
681 681
CIF+COD
1050 1042
Yes Yes
0.28 0.46 0.23
2626
702 702
26
Yes
26 26
[0.06] [0.09]
Yes
[0.87]
Yes Yes Yes
0.27 0.24
26
0.53
[0.10]
[0.91] [0.92] [0.87]
[0.04] [0.09] [0.08]
Yes Yes
0.35
Yes
3939
1300
0.35
Yes
39 39
1300
[1.41]
COD CIF+COD
COD CIF+COD
1287
0.35
Yes
39
1287
Yes
39
CIF CIF
[1.45] [1.46]
0.30
Yes
39
0.30
The table reports fixed-effects panel regressions of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF), capital outflows by domestic agents (COD), and a measure of aggregate capital flows,
CIF+COD, on net capital flows, the trade balance in goods and services, and real GDP growth. All regressions control for country-trend effects. Capital flows are first normalized by
trend GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. The sample period is from 1970 to 2009. Standard errors, clustered at the
country-level, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%,  5%, and 1%, respectively.
CIFCIF COD CIF+COD CIF
38 3838 38
COD CIF+COD
1300
0.33
Yes
CIF
1287
0.31
Yes
39
[0.06] [0.07] [0.07]
[0.05]
CIF COD CIF+COD CIF
[0.07] [0.07]
Table 3
COD CIF+COD
1300
0.33
Yes
39
Cyclicality in Capital Flows
High-Income Countries
1300
0.34
Yes
1300
CIF
Middle-Income Countries
COD CIF+COD
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High-Income 
Countries
Middle-Income 
Countries
Low-Income 
Countries
Net Capital Flows (CIF - COD)
Non-Crisis Years -0.18 0.76 1.73
Crisis Years 2.58 -0.02 1.29
Total Gross Capital Flows (CIF + COD)
Non-Crisis Years 27.53 13.66 8.45
Crisis Years 12.43 -5.21 4.62
Capital Inflows by Foreign Agents (CIF)
Non-Crisis Years 13.67 7.21 5.09
Crisis Years 7.50 -2.62 2.96
Capital Outflows by Domestic Agents (COD)
Non-Crisis Years 13.86 6.45 3.36
Crisis Years 4.92 -2.60 1.66
No. of Countries 39 26 38
Table 4
Capital Flows: Tranquil vs. Crisis Periods
The table shows average capital flows around crisis and non-crisis periods. Crisis years
capture five-year windows around the crisis events, as described in Section 2 of the main text.
Non-crisis years capture all the remaing years in the sample. Capital flows are measured as a
percentage of trend GDP. The sample period is from 1970 to 2009.
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Year t - 2 0.50 *** 0.20 0.21 * 0.18 * 0.05 0.03
Year t - 1 0.70 *** 0.42 *** 0.07 -0.18 0.04 -0.08
Crisis Year -0.13 -0.42 *** -0.44 *** -0.52 *** -0.29 *** -0.25 **
Year t + 1 -0.55 *** -0.63 *** -0.41 *** 0.01 -0.34 *** 0.09
Year t + 2 -0.27 * -0.28 ** -0.41 *** -0.13 -0.30 *** -0.13
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Crisis Year vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.73 *** -0.73 *** -0.58 *** -0.52 *** -0.34 *** -0.23 *
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.92 *** -0.75 *** -0.56 *** -0.21 *** -0.36 *** -0.07 *
Country-Trend Dummies
No. of Crises
No. of Countries
No. of Observations
R-squared
158
1,050
0.21
Yes
134
702
The table reports fixed-effects panel regressions of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) and capital outflows by domestic agents (COD) on a five-year
window around crisis events, controlling for country-trend effects. Capital flows are first normalized by trend GDP and then standardized by de-meaning
and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. One-sided Wald tests comparing pre- and post-crisis periods are also reported. The sample
period is from 1970 to 2009. Standard errors, clustered at the country-level, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
0.24
Yes
26 38
158
1,050
0.18
Yes
38
[0.12] [0.11] [0.08]
[0.14] [0.12] [0.09]
[0.09]
[0.09]
[0.09]
[0.11] [0.15] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10]
[0.12] [0.13]
1,300
0.35
Yes
134
702
0.28
Yes
1,300
High-Income Countries Middle-Income Countries Low-Income Countries
0.36
Yes
39 2639
8585
[0.10] [0.08]
Table 5
CIF COD CIF COD CIF COD
Capital Flows around Crises
[0.13] [0.14] [0.12]
[0.11][0.11] [0.13] [0.11] [0.10] [0.11]
[0.11]
[0.08] [0.09]
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Year 2006 1.36 *** 1.55 *** 0.80 *** 1.16 *** 0.15 1.01 ***
Year 2007 2.22 *** 2.25 *** 1.75 *** 1.91 *** 0.65 *** 1.18 ***
Year 2008 0.36 0.19 0.48 ** 0.11 0.59 *** 0.18
Year 2009 -0.21 -0.14 0.21 0.34 0.02 0.58
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Year 2008 vs. Avg. Previous 2 Years -1.43 *** -1.71 *** -0.80 *** -1.43 *** 0.19 -0.92 ***
Avg. 2008 /2009 vs. Avg. Previous 2 Years -1.72 *** -1.88 *** -0.93 *** -1.31 *** -0.10 -0.72 **
No. of Countries
No. of Observations
R-squared
Year t - 2 0.35 *** -0.02 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.02
Year t - 1 0.28 ** -0.07 -0.03 -0.24 ** 0.05 -0.07
Panel A. Capital Flows around 2008
Middle-Income Countries Low-Income Countries
CIF COD CIF COD CIF COD
[0.30] [0.28] [0.24] [0.23] [0.39]
High-Income Countries
[0.25] [0.23][0.16]
[0.19]
110
0.17
37
110
0.34
37
[0.71]
[0.22] [0.23]
[0.25] [0.27] [0.22] [0.24] [0.16] [0.24]
[0.19]
[0.16] [0.21] [0.21] [0.17] [0.17]
[0.10] [0.14] [0.11] [0.09] [0.12] [0.11]
132
0.56
39
132
0.61
39
CIF
81
0.52
23
81
0.59
23
COD CIF
Table 6
Robustness Tables
Panel B. Excluding the 2008 Crisis
High-Income Countries Middle-Income Countries Low-Income Countries
CODCIF COD
Crisis Year -0.01 -0.27 ** -0.45 *** -0.49 *** -0.28 *** -0.25 **
Year t + 1 -0.32 *** -0.38 ** -0.37 *** 0.07 -0.30 *** 0.12
Year t + 2 -0.19 -0.18 -0.35 *** -0.08 -0.24 ** -0.08
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Crisis Year vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.33 *** -0.23 *** -0.50 *** -0.41 *** -0.34 *** -0.23 *
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.49 *** -0.23 *** -0.44 *** -0.09 -0.33 *** -0.05
Country-Trend Dummies
No. of Crises
No. of Countries
No. of Observations
R-squared
1,168
154
940
[0.09] [0.10]
0.30
Yes
127
621
0.21
Yes
1,168
39
6666
0.11
Yes
38
154
940
0.21
Yes
The table reports two sets of regressions of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) and capital outflows by domestic agents (COD) on different explanatory
variables. Panel A reports pooled OLS regressions on four year dummies for the 2006-2009 period. Panel B reports fixed-effects panel regressions on a five-
year window around crisis events for the 1970-2005 period, controlling for country-trend effects. Capital flows are first normalized by trend GDP and then
standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. One-sided Wald tests comparing pre- and post-crisis periods are also
reported in both Panels. Standard errors, clustered at the country-level, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
0.18
Yes
26 38
[0.12] [0.07]
0.33
Yes
39 26
127
621
[0.10]
[0.11] [0.15] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.09]
[0.11] [0.12] [0.12]
[0.10] [0.07]
[0.09][0.14] [0.11] [0.10]
[0.13] [0.11] [0.13] [0.10]
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One Crisis Episodes
   Year t - 2 0.45 *** 0.14 0.21 * 0.26 *** -0.07 -0.01
   Year t - 1 0.67 *** 0.34 ** -0.01 -0.14 -0.03 -0.07
   Crisis Year -0.12 -0.45 *** -0.33 ** -0.37 *** -0.21 ** -0.19 **
   Year t + 1 -0.56 *** -0.71 *** -0.35 *** -0.03 -0.26 ** 0.06
   Year t + 2 -0.29 ** -0.31 ** -0.41 *** -0.24 *** -0.26 ** -0.15
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Crisis Year vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.68 *** -0.69 *** -0.43 *** -0.43 *** -0.16 ** -0.15
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.88 *** -0.73 *** -0.46 *** -0.27 *** -0.19 ** -0.05
More than One Crisis Episodes
   Year t - 2 1.72 *** 1.03 ** 0.24 -0.10 0.43 * 0.15
   Year t - 1 1.62 *** 1.84 ** 0.34 -0.28 0.27 -0.06
   Crisis Year -0.35 -0.04 -0.92 *** -1.06 *** -0.63 ** -0.50 **
   Year t + 1 -0.46 0.49 -0.51 *** 0.28 -0.55 ** 0.25
   Year t + 2 0.43 0.71 ** -0.43 ** 0.22 -0.47 ** -0.12
One-Sided Wald Tests:
CIF COD
High-Income Countries Middle-Income Countries Low-Income Countries
CIF COD
Table 7
CIF COD
Capital Flows around Crises of Different Intensities
Crisis Year vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -2.02 *** -1.48 * -1.21 *** -0.87 *** -0.98 *** -0.55 **
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -1.80 *** -1.05 -0.91 *** 0.00 -0.90 *** -0.17
One-Sided Wald Tests: One Crisis vs. More than Once Crisis
Crisis Year -0.23 0.41 -0.59 *** -0.69 *** -0.42 * -0.31
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) 0.20 0.88 -0.26 ** 0.03 -0.31 ** -0.03
Country-Trend Dummies
No. of Only One Crisis Episodes
No. of  More than One Crisis Episodes
No. of Countries
No. of Observations
R-squared
Yes
3838
126
32
Yes
80
The table reports fixed-effects panel regressions of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) and capital outflows by domestic agents (COD) on a five-year
window around crisis events, controlling for country-trend effects. Crisis events are split into One Crisis episodes and More than One Crisis episodes. See
Section 2 of the main text for details on how these indicators are constructed. Capital flows are first normalized by trend GDP and then standardized by de-
meaning and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. One-sided Wald tests comparing pre- and post-crisis periods are also reported. The sample
period is from 1970 to 2009. Standard errors, clustered at the country-level, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
5
1,300
0.37
Yes
39 26
107
Yes
1,050
0.180.22
126
32
1,050
Yes
39 26
10780
27
Yes
0.29
27
702
0.27
5
1,300
0.36
702
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Median 
Average
Median Std. 
Dev.
Median 
Average
Median Std. 
Dev.
Median 
Average
Median Std. 
Dev.
Capital Inflows by Foreign Agents
Portfolio Investments 2.13 2.84 0.58 1.34 0.06 0.62
   1980s 0.60 0.73 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00
   1990s 2.25 1.79 0.48 1.02 0.02 0.15
   2000s 3.35 3.20 0.48 1.46 0.08 0.51
Other Investments 3.86 5.09 1.61 4.87 1.86 4.06
   1980s 2.94 3.01 0.25 3.36 3.19 3.19
   1990s 2.69 3.48 1.77 2.52 1.59 2.74
   2000s 5.98 7.27 1.98 3.36 0.90 2.22
Direct Investments 2.03 2.33 2.23 2.09 2.45 2.22
   1980s 0.64 0.56 0.42 0.38 0.67 0.38
   1990s 1.91 1.25 2.04 1.84 2.25 1.44
   2000s 3.65 2.79 3.12 2.01 3.81 1.98
Capital Outflows by Domestic Agents
Portfolio Investments 2.26 3.22 0.25 0.79 0.05 0.22
   1980s 0.30 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   1990s 1.77 2.25 0.08 0.29 0.00 0.02
   2000s 4.15 3.47 0.52 0.84 0.09 0.30
Other Investments 2.62 3.56 1.07 2.74 0.87 1.73
   1980s 1.58 1.95 0.95 1.53 0.35 0.53
   1990s 1.76 2.68 0.78 1.98 0.68 1.47
   2000s 4.53 4.71 2.25 2.96 1.01 2.17
Direct Investments 1.48 1.93 0.25 0.43 0.04 0.15
   1980s 0.40 0.24 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
   1990s 0.82 0.83 0.07 0.12 0.01 0.03
   2000s 3.07 2.72 0.45 0.58 0.09 0.15
International Reserves 0.77 2.26 1.33 2.78 1.31 2.97
   1980s 0.40 1.46 0.30 2.42 0.01 1.85
   1990s 0.57 2.42 1.32 2.36 1.43 2.31
   2000s 0.94 1.72 1.54 2.53 2.23 2.89
The table shows summary statistics of the components of capital flows by both foreign and domestic agents. The median values of country
averages and standard deviations of capital flows over trend GDP are reported. The sample period is from 1970 to 2009.
Components of Capital Flows: Summary Statistics
High-Income Countries Middle-Income Countries Low-Income Countries
Table 8
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B
A
N
C
O
 D
E
 E
S
P
A
Ñ
A
48
D
O
C
U
M
E
N
T
O
 D
E
 T
R
A
B
A
JO
 N
.º 1039
One Crisis Episodes
   Year t - 2 -0.09 0.21 ** 0.54 *** -0.05 -0.32 ** 0.21 ** 0.08 0.43 *** 0.09
   Year t - 1 -0.16 0.33 ** 0.71 *** 0.06 -0.09 -0.06 0.05 0.53 *** 0.27 **
   Crisis Year -0.40 *** -0.05 0.07 -0.13 -0.17 -0.59 *** -0.33 *** -0.22 0.03
   Year t + 1 0.02 -0.28 ** -0.61 *** -0.30 *** 0.12 -0.38 *** -0.41 *** -0.61 *** -0.39 ***
   Year t + 2 0.14 -0.22 * -0.28 * -0.14 0.08 -0.11 -0.09 -0.38 *** -0.12
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Crisis Year vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.28 * -0.32 ** -0.56 *** -0.14 * 0.04 -0.67 *** -0.40 *** -0.70 *** -0.15 **
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis 0.05 -0.45 *** -0.90 *** -0.20 ** 0.22 -0.44 *** -0.34 *** -0.88 *** -0.34 ***
More than One Crisis Episodes
   Year t - 2 1.40 * 1.01 * 1.01 *** 1.24 1.13 0.10 0.92 ** 1.67 ** 0.81 *
   Year t - 1 0.49 * 0.25 2.00 -0.56 -0.12 0.54 2.25 ** 2.37 *** 1.59 *
   Crisis Year -1.05 -0.52 -0.15 0.31 ** 0.39 -0.45 -0.62 0.74 ** -0.12
   Year t + 1 0.02 -1.31 ** 0.05 0.22 1.03 * -0.26 -0.04 -0.26 0.13
Portfolio 
Equity Flows
Portfolio Debt 
Flows Bank Flows
Direct 
Investments
Table 9.A
Portfolio 
Equity Flows
Portfolio Debt 
Flows Bank Flows
Direct 
Investments
CIF COD
Components of Capital Flows around Crises of Different Intensities
High-Income Countries
Reserves
   Year t + 2 0.28 -0.98 *** 0.54 * 0.92 0.16 0.22 -0.05 0.73 * 0.16
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Crisis Year vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -2.00 * -1.15 *** -1.66 *** -0.03 -0.12 -0.77 -2.21 ** -1.28 * -1.32
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -1.20 * -1.57 *** -1.36 *** 0.14 0.02 -0.48 -1.82 ** -1.62 ** -1.14 *
Country-Trend Dummies
No. of Only One Crisis Episodes
No. of  More than One Crisis Episodes
No. of Countries
No. of Observations
R-squared
80
5
Yes
38 39
80
5
Yes
39
80
5
Yes
0.37
1,300
0.21
39
80
5
1,300
0.29
5
1,300
5
1,300
0.06
80
5
80
0.22
Yes Yes
39
0.30
Yes
38
1,250
Yes
39
80
1,251
0.29
1,184
The table reports fixed-effects panel regressions of the components of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) and of capital outflows by domestic agents (COD) for high-income countries on a five-year window around crisis
events, controlling for country-trend effects. Portfolio Equity Flows and Portfolio Debt Flows are subcomponents of "Portfolio Investments", Bank Flows is equivalent to "Other Investments", and "Reserves" is equivalent to
"International Reserve Assets." Crisis events are split into One Crisis episodes and More than One Crisis episodes. See Section 2 of the main text for details on how these indicators are constructed. The components of
capital flows are first normalized by trend GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by their standard deviation at the country level. One-sided Wald tests comparing pre- and post-crisis periods are also
reported.  The sample period is from 1970 to 2009. Standard errors, clustered at the country-level, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%,  5%, and 1% respectively.
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One Crisis Episodes
   Year t - 2 0.08 0.14 0.19 -0.02 0.22 * 0.06 -0.07 0.20 ** 0.04
   Year t - 1 -0.12 -0.03 0.12 -0.07 -0.22 ** 0.25 ** -0.13 0.02 -0.04
   Crisis Year -0.41 *** -0.05 -0.22 -0.20 ** -0.46 *** -0.08 0.00 -0.08 0.06
   Year t + 1 -0.02 0.08 -0.35 *** -0.33 *** -0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.00 -0.13
   Year t + 2 -0.20 * -0.13 -0.35 ** -0.19 ** -0.24 ** -0.13 0.14 -0.09 -0.20 **
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Crisis Year vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.39 *** -0.11 -0.38 *** -0.16 * -0.46 *** -0.24 ** 0.10 -0.19 * 0.06
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.19 ** -0.09 -0.46 *** -0.20 *** -0.24 ** -0.23 *** 0.16 -0.17 ** -0.09
More than One Crisis Episodes
   Year t - 2 0.03 0.15 0.20 0.02 -0.07 0.00 0.26 0.08 0.09
   Year t - 1 0.36 0.30 0.31 -0.07 -0.41 ** 0.09 -0.23 *** 0.04 0.09
   Crisis Year 0.06 -0.44 *** -0.84 *** -0.30 -1.00 *** -0.32 *** -0.33 -0.30 -0.23
   Year t + 1 0.12 -0.24 ** -0.42 ** -0.30 ** 0.32 -0.00 -0.09 0.21 -0.27 **
   Year t + 2 0.28 -0.22 -0.42 *** -0.19 0.38 ** -0.29 *** 0.54 *** -0.17 -0.20
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Crisis Year vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.14 -0.67 *** -1.10 *** -0.28 * -0.76 *** -0.37 ** -0.35 * -0.36 -0.32 **
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.04 -0.53 *** -0.82 *** -0.24 0.14 -0.25 0.03 -0.15 -0.32 ***
Country-Trend Dummies
No. of Only One Crisis Episodes
No. of  More than One Crisis Episodes
No. of Countries
No. of Observations
R-squared 0.16 0.31
702 717 664 702 634
23 26 26 26
0.17 0.15
98 107 107 109
The table reports fixed-effects panel regressions of the components of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) and of capital outflows by domestic agents (COD) for middle-income countries on a five-year window around crisis
events, controlling for country-trend effects. Portfolio Equity Flows and Portfolio Debt Flows are subcomponents of "Portfolio Investments", Bank Flows is equivalent to "Other Investments", and "Reserves" is equivalent to
"International Reserve Assets." Crisis events are split into One Crisis episodes and More than One Crisis episodes. See Section 2 of the main text for details on how these indicators are constructed. The components of capital
flows are first normalized by trend GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by their standard deviation at the country level. One-sided Wald tests comparing pre- and post-crisis periods are also reported. The
sample period is from 1970 to 2009. Standard errors, clustered at the country-level, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%,  5%, and 1% respectively.
23 24 26 2322
0.11 0.09 0.24 0.39 0.19
634604 632 702
26 27 27 27 27
Yes
24 27 27
YesYes Yes Yes
Direct 
Investments Reserves
26
Yes Yes
Components of Capital Flows around Crises of Different Intensities
Middle-Income Countries
98 100 107 9894
Yes Yes
Table 9.B
CIF COD
Portfolio Debt 
Flows Bank Flows
Direct 
Investments
Portfolio 
Equity Flows
Portfolio Debt 
Flows Bank Flows
Portfolio 
Equity Flows
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One Crisis Episodes
   Year t - 2 -0.21 * 0.05 0.01 -0.15 ** 0.02 -0.10 0.05 0.04 -0.02
   Year t - 1 0.08 -0.14 * 0.05 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 0.05 0.01
   Crisis Year -0.14 * -0.20 -0.21 ** -0.09 -0.14 -0.03 -0.00 -0.04 0.02
   Year t + 1 0.06 -0.22 ** -0.20 ** -0.12 -0.07 -0.14 *** -0.12 0.31 *** -0.10
   Year t + 2 -0.05 -0.14 -0.21 ** -0.20 ** -0.10 -0.11 ** -0.07 -0.05 -0.16 **
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Crisis Year vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.08 -0.16 -0.24 ** 0.03 -0.11 0.06 0.02 -0.09 0.03
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis 0.02 -0.14 * -0.24 ** -0.02 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.08
More than One Crisis Episodes
   Year t - 2 0.41 * 0.59 * 0.33 * 0.23 0.08 -0.01 0.04 0.16 0.00
   Year t - 1 0.22 0.51 ** 0.26 0.12 -0.42 ** -0.02 -0.23 ** 0.31 0.08
   Crisis Year -0.18 -0.08 -0.65 ** -0.04 -0.56 ** -0.01 -0.13 * -0.07 -0.03
   Year t + 1 -0.07 -0.25 -0.41 ** -0.24 0.16 0.15 -0.15 0.20 -0.08
Direct 
Investments Reserves
Components of Capital Flows around Crises of Different Intensities
Low-Income Countries
Table 9.C
CIF COD
Portfolio Debt 
Flows Bank Flows
Direct 
Investments
Portfolio 
Equity Flows
Portfolio Debt 
Flows Bank Flows
Portfolio 
Equity Flows
   Year t + 2 0.05 -0.18 -0.35 ** -0.24 0.26 -0.08 -0.10 -0.57 *** -0.16
One-Sided Wald Tests:
Crisis Year vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.50 * -0.63 ** -0.95 *** -0.22 * -0.39 * 0.01 -0.04 -0.31 * -0.07
Avg. Post-Crisis (incl. Crisis Year) vs. Avg. Pre-Crisis -0.38 ** -0.72 *** -0.77 *** -0.35 ** 0.12 0.04 -0.03 -0.38 *** -0.13
Country-Trend Dummies
No. of Only One Crisis Episodes
No. of  More than One Crisis Episodes
No. of Countries
No. of Observations
R-squared 0.15 0.25
1,050 1,050 853 1,050 889
30 38 38 38
0.13 0.12
108 126 126 126
The table reports fixed-effects panel regressions of the components of capital inflows by foreign agents (CIF) and of capital outflows by domestic agents (COD) for low-income countries on a five-year window around crisis
events, controlling for country-trend effects. Portfolio Equity Flows and Portfolio Debt Flows are subcomponents of "Portfolio Investments", Bank Flows is equivalent to "Other Investments", and "Reserves" is equivalent to
"International Reserve Assets." Crisis events are split into One Crisis episodes and More than One Crisis episodes. See Section 2 of the main text for details on how these indicators are constructed. The components of capital
flows are first normalized by trend GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by their standard deviation at the country level. One-sided Wald tests comparing pre- and post-crisis periods are also reported. The
sample period is from 1970 to 2009. Standard errors, clustered at the country-level, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%,  5%, and 1% respectively.
32 31 38 3330
0.12 0.12 0.26 0.38 0.12
890821 853 1,050
24 29 32 32 32
Yes
29 27 32
YesYes Yes Yes
26
Yes Yes
109 111 126 10792
Yes Yes
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High-Income Countries Coverage Middle-Income Countries (cont.) Coverage
Australia 1970 - 2008 Libya 1977 - 2008
Austria 1970 - 2009 Lithuania 1993 - 2008
Bahamas, The 1976 - 2008 Malaysia 1974 - 2008
Barbados 1970 - 2007 Mauritius 1976 - 2008
Belgium-Luxembourg 1975 - 2008 Mexico 1979 - 2008
Canada 1970 - 2009 Panama 1977 - 2009
Cyprus 1976 - 2009 Poland 1985 - 2009
Czech Republic 1993 - 2008 Romania 1987 - 2009
Denmark 1975 - 2009 Russian Federation 1994 - 2009
Estonia 1992 - 2009 South Africa 1985 - 2009
Finland 1975 - 2009 Turkey 1974 - 2008
France 1975 - 2008 Uruguay 1978 - 2008
Germany 1971 - 2008 Venezuela, R.B. 1970 - 2009
Greece 1976 - 2008
Hong Kong 1998 - 2008
Hungary 1982 - 2008 Low-Income Countries Coverage
Iceland 1976 - 2009 Albania 1984 - 2008
Ireland 1974 - 2009 Algeria 1977 - 1991
Israel 1970 - 2009 Angola 1985 - 2008
Italy 1970 - 2009 Armenia 1993 - 2008
Japan 1977 - 2008 Azerbaijan, Rep. of 1995 - 2008
Korea, Rep. 1976 - 2009 Bolivia 1976 - 2008
Kuwait 1975 - 2008 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998 - 2008
Malta 1971 - 2008 China, P.R.: Mainland 1982 - 2008
Netherlands 1970 - 2009 Colombia 1970 - 2008
New Zealand 1972 - 2008 Congo, Republic of 1978 - 2007
Norway 1975 - 2008 Dominican Republic 1970 - 2008
Oman 1974 - 2008 Ecuador 1976 - 2008
Portugal 1975 - 2009 Egypt 1977 - 2008
Saudi Arabia 1971 - 2008 El Salvador 1976 - 2008
Singapore 1972 - 2008 Georgia 1997 - 2008
Slovak Republic 1993 - 2008 Guatemala 1977 - 2008
Slovenia 1992 - 2008 Honduras 1974 - 2008
Spain 1975 - 2009 India 1975 - 2008
Sweden 1970 - 2008 Indonesia 1981 - 2009
Switzerland 1977 - 2009 Jamaica 1976 - 2008
Trinidad and Tobago 1975 - 2007 Jordan 1972 - 2008
United Kingdom 1970 - 2009 Macedonia 1996 - 2008
United States 1970 - 2009 Moldova 1994 - 2009
Mongolia 1981 - 2006
Middle-Income Countries Coverage Morocco 1975 - 2008
Argentina 1976 - 2009 Namibia 1990 - 2008
Belarus 1993 - 2009 Nicaragua 1977 - 2008
Botswana 1975 - 2008 Pakistan 1976 - 2008
Brazil 1975 - 2009 Paraguay 1975 - 2009
Bulgaria 1980 - 2009 Peru 1977 - 2008
Chile 1975 - 2009 Philippines 1977 - 2008
Costa Rica 1977 - 2008 Sri Lanka 1975 - 2008
Croatia 1993 - 2008 Swaziland 1974 - 2007
Equatorial Guinea 1987 - 1996 Syrian Arab Republic 1977 - 2007
Gabon 1978 - 2005 Thailand 1975 - 2008
Iran, I.R. of 1976 - 2000 Tunisia 1976 - 2008
Kazakhstan 1995 - 2008 Ukraine 1994 - 2009
Latvia 1992 - 2009 Vietnam 1996 - 2008
Appendix Table 1
Sample Coverage
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High-Income Countries Crisis Dates Middle-Income Countries (cont.) Crisis Dates
Australia 1989 Libya 2002
Austria - Lithuania 1995
Bahamas, The - Malaysia 1985, 1997
Barbados - Mauritius 1981, 1996
Belgium-Luxembourg - Mexico 1981, 1985, 1994
Canada 1983 Panama 1983, 1987
Cyprus - Poland 1986, 1989
Czech Republic 1996 Romania 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999
Denmark 1987 Russian Federation 1995, 1998
Estonia 1992, 1998 South Africa 1985, 1989, 1993, 2001, 2008
Finland 1991 Turkey 1978, 1982, 1988, 1994, 1999, 2008
France 1994 Uruguay 1978, 1981, 1987, 2002
Germany 1976 Venezuela, R.B. 1976, 1982, 1989, 1993, 2002
Greece 1983, 1991
Hong Kong 1998
Hungary 1991 Low-Income Countries Crisis Dates
Iceland 1978, 1985, 1989, 1993, 2008 Albania 1990, 1997
Ireland - Algeria 1988
Israel 1975, 1985 Angola 1985, 1988, 1991, 1996
Italy 1981, 1990 Armenia 1994
Japan 1992, 1997 Azerbaijan, Rep. of 1995
Korea, Rep. 1980, 1983, 1997, 2008 Bolivia 1980, 1985, 1994, 1999
Kuwait 1980, 1990 Bosnia and Herzegovina -
Malta - China, P.R.: Mainland 1984, 1990, 1998
Netherlands - Colombia 1982, 1985, 1998
New Zealand 1984, 1987, 2008 Congo, Republic of 1983, 1986, 1991
Norway 1987, 1990 Dominican Republic 1975, 1982, 1985, 1990, 2003
Oman - Ecuador 1980, 1996, 2008
Portugal 1982 Egypt 1979, 1984, 1989, 2003
Saudi Arabia - El Salvador 1981, 1986, 1989, 1998
Singapore 1982 Georgia 1998
Slovak Republic 1998 Guatemala 1986, 1989, 2001, 2006
Slovenia 1992 Honduras 1981, 1990, 1999
Spain 1977, 1983 India 1991
Sweden 1991 Indonesia 1983, 1986, 1992, 1997
Switzerland - Jamaica 1978, 1981, 1987, 1991
Trinidad and Tobago 1982, 1985, 1993 Jordan 1988
United Kingdom 1974, 1980, 1984, 1991, 1995, 2007 Macedonia 1997
United States 1984, 1988, 2007 Moldova 1998, 2002
Mongolia 1990, 1993, 1996
Middle-Income Countries Crisis Dates Morocco 1980, 1986
Argentina 1980, 1985, 1995, 2001 Namibia 2001, 2008
Belarus 1994, 1999 Nicaragua 1979, 1985, 1990, 2000
Botswana 1984, 1994, 2001 Pakistan 1981, 1998
Brazil 1976, 1982, 1990, 1999, 2002, 2008 Paraguay 1982, 1989, 1995, 2001
Bulgaria 1990, 1993, 1996 Peru 1978, 1988, 1999
Chile 1975, 1980 Philippines 1981, 1997
Costa Rica 1981, 1987, 1991, 1994 Sri Lanka 1977, 1981, 1989, 1996
Croatia 1993, 1996 Swaziland 1984, 1995, 2001
Equatorial Guinea 1994 Syrian Arab Republic 1988
Gabon 1986, 1994, 1999, 2002 Thailand 1983, 1996
Iran, I.R. of 1978, 1985, 1992, 2000 Tunisia 1980, 1991
Kazakhstan 1999 Ukraine 1997, 2008
Latvia 1992, 1995 Vietnam 1997
Appendix Table 2
Crisis Dates
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